HUGHES FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

4/20/2020 9:10 AM

PRETRIAL AND ERROR:
THE USE OF STATEMENTS
INADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL IN
PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
ERIN HUGHES∗
INTRODUCTION
“I plead the Fifth.” It is a phrase so ubiquitous in American popular
culture that even courts credit “shows like ‘Law & Order’ [and] movies
such as ‘Guys and Dolls,’” with creating a “culture . . . that knows a
person in custody has ‘the right to remain silent.’”1 The Supreme Court
itself has acknowledged that “in popular parlance and even in legal
literature, the term ‘Fifth Amendment’ . . . is commonly regarded as
being synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination.”2
Despite Americans’ seeming familiarity with the Amendment’s
protections, the exact parameters of its privilege against selfincrimination remain undefined for America’s criminally accused.
While it is well-settled that statements violating the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause are inadmissible at trial, this has not stopped
prosecutors from using such statements in pretrial proceedings to
establish probable cause for trial or to set the terms of a defendant’s
bail. These pretrial proceedings are critical for two reasons: first, they
play a role in the defendant’s trial decisions and strategies, and second,
they may persuade a defendant to take a plea. Most critically, pretrial
proceedings can also result in the accused’s loss of liberty.
The Seventh Circuit recently examined a case in which a statement
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment was used against a
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woman in pretrial proceedings. On January 13, 2000, three police
officers took Teresa Sornberger to the police station for questioning
because they suspected that her husband, Scott, had robbed a local
bank.3 Frustrated by Teresa’s earlier interview, in which she had
provided an alibi for her husband, the officers ensured that this
interview would proceed differently.4 The officers falsely informed
Teresa that witnesses placed her at the scene of the robbery and falsely
promised her that, if she implicated her husband, she would not be
charged with any crime.5 The officers also repeatedly told Teresa to
think about her children and made threats to take away her children by
calling the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”).6
After repeated threats to call DCFS if she continued to maintain
her husband’s innocence, Teresa verbally confessed that she had
assisted her husband in the bank robbery.7 Following this oral
confession, the officers gave Teresa the required Miranda warnings and
asked her to repeat her oral confession to the police stenographer.8
When Teresa resisted repeating the statement, the officers again
reminded her to think of her children and reiterated their threat to call
DCFS.9 Teresa reluctantly complied, gave her statement to the
stenographer, and signed the statement.10 This statement, which was
unwarned and coerced and therefore would be inadmissible at trial,
was then used in three separate pretrial proceedings.11 The prosecution
used Teresa’s unwarned statements to support a determination of
probable cause in a preliminary hearing, which allowed the case to
proceed to trial.12 These statements were also used at arraignment
proceedings, when Teresa was called upon to enter a pretrial plea.13 But
perhaps most damaging, Teresa’s coerced, false confession was used at
her bail hearing, and bail was set at an amount Teresa was unable to

3. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 2006).
4. Id. at 1012.
5. Id. at 1011.
6. Id. at 1012.
7. Id. at 1011.
8. Id. at 1012.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1027 (noting that “failure to administer Teresa Miranda warnings led to three
distinct ‘courtroom uses’ of her un-warned statements”); see also id. at 1023 n.16 (acknowledging
that the facts in the record could support a finding that the statement was coerced, as “[t]hreats
to a suspect’s family or children, even if implicit, certainly may render confessions involuntary for
purposes of due process”).
12. Id. at 1026.
13. Id.
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make.14 As a result of these three proceedings, Teresa Sornberger spent
four months in jail awaiting trial before the true bank robber
confessed.15 Teresa lost her liberty for four months, primarily based on
evidence that would have been inadmissible at trial.
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found that Teresa’s criminal
prosecution was initiated because of her coerced confession, violating
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.16 The court
determined that the use of Teresa’s confession at a probable cause
hearing, bail hearing, and arraignment hearing violated the Fifth
Amendment’s proscription against compelling a criminal defendant
“to be a witness against [her]self.”17
Not all circuits agree with the Seventh Circuit that use of such
statements at pretrial hearings are a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
It is well-established that the Self-Incrimination Clause means that a
person cannot be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,” and that using a statement that is “testimonial,
incriminating, and compelled,” is a violation of the clause.18 But the
circuits are fractured over the meaning of “criminal case” within the
Fifth Amendment. There are differing interpretations over the precise
moment that a “criminal case” begins, and therefore, what proceedings
are covered by a person’s right against self-incrimination. The Supreme
Court offered some guidance on this matter in Chavez v. Martinez.19
Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality, noted that “[s]tatements
compelled by police interrogations of course may not be used against a
defendant at trial . . . but it is not until their use in a criminal case that
a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.”20 Justice Thomas
refused to articulate when a criminal case begins, but conceded that a
“‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the initiation of legal
proceedings, and police questioning does not constitute such a case.”21
In the absence of more specific definition from the Supreme Court,
circuits have splintered over when a criminal case begins and therefore
have also disagreed as to the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination. The Third, Fourth and Fifth
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004).
538 U.S. 760 (2003).
Id. at 767.
Id.
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Circuits have held that the Self-Incrimination Clause is only a “trial
right,” meaning that its protections do not extent to pretrial
proceedings.22 But the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
adopted an interpretation of “criminal case” that includes pretrial
proceedings, shielding defendants like Teresa Sornberger from acting
as witnesses against themselves throughout the criminal process.23
This Note argues that a “criminal case,” as provided by the Fifth
Amendment, begins with the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal
proceedings, whether that commencement occurs through a formal
charge, a preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.24 A broad understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s scope
aligns with the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ analysis. In
particular, this Note endorses the in-depth analysis provided by the
Tenth Circuit in its determination that a “criminal case” under the Fifth
Amendment includes preliminary proceedings. This Note further offers
an analysis of past Supreme Court precedent as well as policy rationales
that support a more liberal understanding of “criminal case.”
As the Supreme Court has recognized, our justice system is “for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”25 As part of the
system of pleas, “the most critical period of the proceedings against
these defendants . . . [is] from the time of their arraignment until the
beginning of their trial.”26 Given that close to 98% of federal
defendants opt to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial,27 it is
difficult to overstate the importance of the pretrial period. Limiting the
application of the Self-Incrimination Clause to trials denies this right
to almost all charged with a crime.
Part One of this Note provides a brief overview of the types of
proceedings conducted before trial, and the impact these proceedings
can have in shaping the way a trial unfolds. Part Two addresses the

22. Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 285
(5th Cir. 2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 2003).
23. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2017); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582
F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2007); Sornberger
v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–1027 (7th Cir. 2006).
24. This Note is limited to a discussion of the federal pretrial processes.
25. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
27. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, Fiscal Year 2018 Overview of Federal Criminal
Cases, at 8 (June 2019) [hereinafter Fiscal Year 2018 Overview]; see also DEP’T OF JUST., Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.22.2010,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter
Dep’t of Justice Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics].
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circuit split over the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause, beginning
with an examination of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chavez v.
Martinez, and then examining the circuits’ interpretation of its holding.
Part Three provides an in-depth examination of the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis that the Self-Incrimination Clause should be applied to pretrial
proceedings.
Part Four provides arguments that have not been previously made
about why a “criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment should
include pretrial proceedings. This Part posits that a broad
understanding of a “criminal case” is consistent with the Court’s other
applications of the Self-Incrimination Clause and previous Court
declarations that preliminary hearings are part of a criminal case. This
Note contends that understanding the criminal case as commencing at
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings not only aligns
with Justice Thomas’s opinion in Chavez, but is also consistent with
Supreme Court precedent about the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel.
Finally, Part Five of this Note offers the public policy rationale for
extending the right to pretrial proceeding so that the right is afforded
to all those who begin criminal proceedings, not just the 2.5% of cases
that go to trial.28 It also explores the policy counter-arguments that have
been raised by those who believe that the Self-Incrimination Clause
should be limited to only trial proceedings.
I. PRETRIAL PROCEDURES: AN OVERVIEW
In a federal criminal case, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(the “Rules”) govern pretrial procedures.29 These mandatory pretrial
proceedings are the defendant’s initial foray into the courtroom
following an arrest or formal charge in a criminal case.30 While the exact
process may differ based on the needs of an individual case, the types
of proceedings and their requirements are the same.31 This section
provides an overview of the different pretrial proceedings and the way
that pretrial processes can affect what happens at trial.

28. See Fiscal Year 2018 Overview, supra note 27.
29. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a) (noting that the rules “govern the procedure in all criminal
proceedings” in the federal courts).
30. Pretrial Hearings, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 286, 286 (2018).
31. Id.
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A. Types and Purposes of Pretrial Proceedings
Following arrest, a federal criminal defendant has several possible
opportunities—both mandatory and optional—to appear before the
court before trial commences.32 Each proceeding safeguards the
accused’s constitutional rights, beginning with the Gerstein hearing.33 A
Gerstein hearing, a mandatory proceeding held within 48 hours of a
warrantless arrest, reviews the police determination that there was
probable cause to make the arrest and determines whether there is
probable cause to detain the arrestee pending further proceedings.34
Gerstein hearings may be held in conjunction with “initial
appearances,” a proceeding mandated by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.35 The two proceedings may also occur
independently of each other.36 In an initial appearance, the arresting
officer is required to bring the accused before a magistrate judge
“without delay.”37 During the initial appearance, the defendant hears
the charges against him in open court and is advised of his rights;
arrangements are also made for him to have a lawyer (either his own
or a public defender).38 The defendant may also enter a plea at this
time.39 Bail hearings, sometimes referred to as detention hearings, may
occur at this initial appearance, or as an entirely separate hearing at a
later date.40 The judge uses this hearing to determine the bail amount
or whether the accused is released pending trial.41 If the accused cannot
meet the bail amount, he is remanded to the custody of the U.S.
Marshals pending trial.42
While Gerstein hearings are held to establish probable cause for an
arrest, other pretrial proceedings are used to establish the existence of
probable cause for trial; namely, preliminary hearings and grand juries.
Rule 5.1(a) provides the defendant with a preliminary hearing, also
32. Id.
33. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
34. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 286–87, 289.
35. Id. at 286.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 289. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(d) governs the “initial appearance”
proceedings for a felony offense, and Rule 58(b)(2) establishes the procedure for initial
appearances in misdemeanor and petty offense cases.
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10; see also Offices of the United States Attorneys, Initial Hearing /
Arraignment, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/initial-hearing (last
accessed Feb. 2, 2020).
39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(3); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10.
40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(3).
41. Initial Hearing / Arraignment, supra note 3838.
42. Id.
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known as a preliminary examination or probable cause hearing.43 No
matter the name, the purpose of this hearing is to demonstrate to the
judge’s satisfaction that there is sufficient evidence for the case to
proceed to trial.44 The hearing occurs within either 14 days of arrest if
the defendant is in custody, or 21 days if the defendant is not in
custody.45 This hearing is not required if the defendant waives his right
to the proceeding or if the prosecutor secures an indictment from a
grand jury.46
Securing an indictment from a grand jury is another proceeding
used to establish the existence of probable cause.47 In a grand jury
proceeding, a prosecutor presents the evidence gathered in the case to
a group of 16 to 23 jurors;48 at least 12 members of the grand jury must
believe there is a showing of cause for the government to obtain an
indictment.49 An indictment satisfies the general requirement that there
is probable cause for trial;50 if there is no indictment, and no probable
cause found at a preliminary hearing, the case will be dismissed and the
defendant will not be forced to stand trial.51 The Rules and pretrial
proceedings are meant to ensure due process, and serve to guarantee
that a citizen’s constitutional rights are not violated.52

43. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 291–92. Although initial appearances and preliminary
hearings may occur at the same time, this is rare because it does not provide counsel with adequate
time to prepare for the preliminary hearing. Id. at 286.
44. Id. at 291. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). This is required if a defendant is charged with
an offense other than a petty offense, and is conducted by a magistrate judge. If the magistrate
judge finds no probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or the defendant
committed it, the complaint must be dismissed, and the defendant must be discharged. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5.1(f).
45. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 292.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 295.
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1).
49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a).
51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(f).
52. See, e.g., Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 42 (1995) (quoting Advisory Committee’s
Notes on FED. R. CRIM. P. 11) (noting that the Rule 11 inquiry is meant to determine the
voluntariness of a plea and protect defendants who do not “realiz[e] that [their] conduct does not
actually fall within the charge”); id. at 52 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 10 ensures that arraignment shall be conducted in open court, and helps him
to understand the nature of the charges and his rights); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)
(requiring that a judicial finding of probable cause must follow a warrantless arrest to impose any
significant pretrial restraint on liberty); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 412 (1948) (finding
that the “plain purpose” of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), “that prisoners should
promptly be taken before committing magistrates,” is to prevent officers from “secret
interrogation of persons accused of crime” (internal quotations omitted)).
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B. The Effects of Pretrial Proceedings on Trial
Pretrial proceedings are crucial in determining the restrictions on
the accused’s freedoms (through the terms of the accused’s bond or
remanding the defendant to jail awaiting trial), as well as if and how the
trial proceeds. The most extensive and adversarial of these pretrial
procedures is the preliminary hearing. As discussed above, if a judge
finds that the government does not have sufficient evidence to support
a finding of probable cause, she may dismiss the case altogether.53 Even
if the judge finds that there is enough evidence to proceed to trial, the
evidence that the government presents at a preliminary hearing can
cause the court to reassess the bail amount or other terms of pretrial
release.54 Preliminary hearings are also used to preserve evidence and
lay the foundation for potential witness impeachment or preserve
witness testimony for use at trial (if the witness is later unavailable).55
The preliminary hearing provides several benefits to the defendant.
First, the defendant is given the opportunity to persuade the judge that
there is not enough evidence to proceed to trial, cross-examine
witnesses, and even present his own evidence to the court.56 Second, the
preliminary hearing can be vital to the defense counsel’s strategy
determinations, because it allows for an assessment of the strength or
weakness of the prosecution’s case.57 Although the preliminary
hearing’s purpose is not to provide discovery to the defendant, that is
often a byproduct of the proceeding.58 Given the volume of information
presented at the preliminary hearings, prosecutors use these hearings
to their strategic advantage, engaging in different tactics like chargepiling and case-piling, in pursuit of a plea deal.59 Preliminary hearings
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(f).
54. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (observing that at a preliminary hearing,
“counsel can also be influential . . . in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters
as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail”).
55. See id. (noting that at preliminary hearing “skilled interrogation of witnesses by an
experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the
State’s witnesses at the trial . . . [and] preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness
who does not appear at the trial”).
56. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 292.
57. See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9 (“[T]rained counsel” at a preliminary hearing can “discover
the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to
meet that case at the trial.”).
58. Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 293.
59. Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303,
1312–13 (2018). Charge-piling and case-piling refer to the prosecutorial strategy of “piling on
overlapping, largely duplicative offenses—increasing with each new charge the defendant’s
potential sentence, his risk of conviction, and the “sticker shock” of intimidation that accompanies
a hefty charging instrument” so that a defendant may be willing to negotiate to the prosecutor’s
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are an “integral part” of the plea bargaining process because
prosecutors can use them to stress upon a defendant the weight of the
evidence.60
Aside from the preliminary hearing’s purpose of determining
whether to proceed or dismiss the case, other pretrial proceedings can
have a greater impact on an individual’s freedoms and personal life.
Detention hearings are particularly critical pretrial proceedings. At this
stage, the court decides whether to detain the defendant or set bail.61 In
considering whether to set bail, the court evaluates evidence of the
defendant’s ties to the community, his risk of flight, and the potential
danger he poses to the public.62 If the court opts to set bail, it must also
determine what amount, which may be too high for the defendant to
meet.63 And, as discussed below, pretrial confinement has significant
weight in a defendant’s decision to plead guilty or proceed to trial.64
The Court has noted that “pretrial confinement may imperil the
suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships,” but that even “pretrial release may be accompanied by
burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty.”65
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S AMBIGUITY BIRTHS A CIRCUIT SPLIT
As explored in Part I, pretrial proceedings are an important step in
the process of a criminal case. But the parameters of a defendant’s
constitutional rights during this pretrial stage are not clearly defined.
The Fifth Amendment dictates that a person shall not “be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”66 Despite this
mandate, there is ambiguity over when this right applies: specifically,
whether pretrial proceedings qualify as part of a criminal case. The
Supreme Court acknowledged the uncertainty about what proceedings
were worthy of the Self-Incrimination Clause’s protections in Chavez
v. Martinez, but decided that it did not need to explore the parameters
of “when a criminal case begins.”67 The Court therefore did not

“preferred sentence.” Id.
60. Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §14.1(e), at 899 (6th ed. 2017).
61. Bail, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 387, 390 (2018).
62. Id. at 394.
63. Initial Hearing / Arraignment, supra note 38.
64. Infra, Part V.
65. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003).
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explicitly decide whether pretrial proceedings were covered by the
Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination.68
After Chavez, the circuits differed in their interpretations of
“criminal case” in Self-Incrimination Clause analyses. Of the twelve
circuits, seven have addressed the issue. The circuits are split nearly
down the middle. Three circuits believe that a criminal case begins at
trial and that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies only to trial
proceedings. Four circuits have come to the opposite conclusion, and
provided liberal interpretations of the timeline of a “criminal case,”
thus extending the Fifth Amendment protection to pretrial proceedings
as well. This section explores the Supreme Court decision that gave rise
to the circuit split, the determinations of each circuit that has
deliberated on this issue, and the Court’s most recent foray into
clarifying when a “criminal case” begins, which ultimately reached no
conclusion on the issue.
A. The Supreme Court’s Inconclusive Definition of a “Criminal Case”
In Chavez, the Supreme Court examined whether Ben Chavez, a
patrol officer in Southern California, had violated Oliverio Martinez’s
Fifth Amendment rights. Martinez was injured in a shootout with police
and rushed to the hospital.69 While he was treated for his wounds,
Martinez verbally expressed a belief he was dying and lamented his
pain as Chavez interrogated him about the events of the shootout.70
Chavez persisted with the interrogation despite Martinez’s statement
that he would not tell Chavez anything until he was treated.71 At no
point were Miranda warnings issued.72 The interrogation concluded
when Martinez admitted that he used heroin, and had taken an officer’s
gun during the incident. 73
Martinez was never charged with a crime, and his answers never
used against him in a criminal proceeding.74 But Martinez initiated
proceedings of his own. He filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit on the premise
that Chavez’s actions violated Martinez’s Fifth Amendment right not
to be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”75
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764–65.

HUGHES FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

PRETRIAL AND ERROR

4/20/2020 9:10 AM

155

The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that Chavez’s coercive questioning
was a violation of the Fifth Amendment, regardless of the fact that the
statements were not used in a single criminal proceeding.76
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, although
the Court fractured. Justice Thomas delivered the judgment of the
Court, and explained that because criminal charges were never brought
against Martinez, there was no Fifth Amendment violation.77 Justices
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter agreed with this outcome.78 In
his plurality opinion, Justice Thomas specifically noted that, for
purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, a “criminal case” requires
“at the very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings.”79
Because there was no initiation of a criminal case against Martinez,
Justice Thomas asserted that there was no need to define “the precise
moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences;” rather, it was enough to
limit this case to holding that police questioning “does not constitute a
‘case.’”80
Justice Thomas further noted that a Self-Incrimination Clause
violation does not occur until the compelled statements are used in a
criminal case.81 He maintained that “mere coercion does not violate the
text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled
statements in a criminal case against the witness.”82 In doing so, Justice
Thomas conceded that Supreme Court precedent mandates that the
Fifth Amendment allows a person to not answer questions in “any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”83
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas still concluded that a violation of the right

76. Id. at 765.
77. Id. at 766.
78. Id. at 763. In addition to Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion, Justice Souter delivered a
separate opinion, which Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined as to Part II. Id.
at 777 (Souter, J., concurring). Part II concluded that the issue of whether Martinez may pursue
a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand. See id.
at 779–80 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 766. This part of the opinion, discussing what constitutes a “criminal case,” was
joined only by Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia.
80. Id. at 767.
81. Id. In making this assertion, Justice Thomas also quoted United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990), which observed, “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although
conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a
constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”
82. Id. at 769.
83. Id. at 770 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972)).
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against self-incrimination occurs only if the person is compelled as a
witness against himself in a criminal case.84
Justices Souter and Breyer, concurring in the judgment, reasoned
that the Fifth Amendment’s text “focuses on courtroom use of a
criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony.”85 In
contrast, Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Ginsburg stated that the SelfIncrimination Clause is violated the moment a confession is compelled,
regardless of whether or not it is used in any proceedings, and that the
Fifth Amendment applied to pretrial proceedings.86
Beyond stating that a criminal case requires at least the initiation
of criminal proceedings, Justice Thomas provided no guidelines as to
what exactly commences a “criminal case.” Therefore, the Court did
not provide a singular, definitive moment that triggers the Fifth
Amendment protections. This move may have been intentional: some
scholars posit that the Court will sometimes issue a “way station”
opinion in the hopes of sparking conversation among the circuit
courts.87 The Court will then address the issue later, invoking the
circuits’ opinions as possible grounds for its decision.88 Whether or not
the plurality opinion in Chavez was intended to be ambiguous and
spark debate among the federal circuits, that has certainly been the
result. Seven circuits have since debated Justice Thomas’s plurality
opinion, with no unifying consensus as to the definition of a “criminal
case” or the parameters of the Self-Incrimination Clause.
B. The Circuit Split Over What Qualifies as a “Criminal Case”
In the nearly two decades since Chavez, the circuits have been left
to determine the limits of the Fifth Amendment in the pretrial context.
In doing so, they are guided only by Justice Thomas’s finding that a
criminal case begins at the initiation of criminal proceedings. However,
because the Court did not explicate if the commencement of criminal
proceedings includes pretrial proceedings, the circuits are split over
whether the right against self-incrimination is strictly a “trial right” or

84. Id.
85. Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 1183, 1197 (2017) (“As justification for overturning precedent, the Court may invoke
tensions in the doctrine and countervailing lines of precedent, even though it obviously
contributed to those tensions.”).
88. See id. at 1201–02 (noting that this action is a way that “the Court invokes changes that
it played a part in causing without candidly admitting as much.”).
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if the Fifth Amendment also permits the use of coerced and compelled
statements in pretrial criminal proceedings. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits have held that the Fifth Amendment is only a trial right.89 The
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that certain
pretrial uses of compelled statements are a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.90 For reasons discussed below, this Note asserts that the
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are correct that the Fifth
Amendment protections should apply to pretrial proceedings, and that
the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the protection is particularly strong.
On one side of the split, the Third,91 Fourth,92 and Fifth93 circuits
adopt a narrow interpretation of “criminal case,” holding that the SelfIncrimination Clause does not apply to pretrial proceedings. In doing
so, the circuits devoted little time or space to an analysis of Chavez or
the definition of “criminal case.”94
The Third Circuit concluded that because Chavez left open the
question of when a criminal case commenced, “it is the use of coerced
statements during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an indictment,
that violates the Constitution.”95 It reached this conclusion despite
acknowledging that a compelled statement used to file criminal charges
was in fact used in “a criminal case in one sense.”96 Indeed, the coerced
statement was used to establish probable cause and obtain a warrant
for the suspect’s arrest.97 And, in a case decided two years after Chavez,
89. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278,
285 (5th Cir. 2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 552 (3d Cir. 2003).
90. See Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment precluded a coerced statement from admission in probable cause hearings); Best v.
City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
protection applied at suppression hearings); Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at probable cause hearings); Higazy v.
Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that that Self-Incrimination Clause applied
to initial appearances and bail hearings”); Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1027
(7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the Fifth Amendment protection was applicable at bail hearings,
arraignments, and probable cause hearings).
91. Renda, 347 F.3d at 557–59. The Third Circuit provided the most analysis of the three
circuits that determined that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies to trial only, devoting 585
words to an analysis of Chavez and comparing it to the case at hand.
92. Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513–14. The Fourth Circuit devoted 518 words to a discussion of
Chavez and its application to the case.
93. Murray, 405 F.3d at 285. The Fifth Circuit confined its holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination can “be violated only at trial,” to a single 31-word sentence,
without exploring the nuances of Chavez or defining “criminal case.”
94. See supra notes 91, 92, 93 (providing the word counts of each circuit’s Chavez analysis).
95. Renda, 347 F.3d at 559.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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the Fifth Circuit merely stated the “privilege against self-incrimination
is a fundamental trial right which can be violated only at trial, even
though pretrial conduct by law enforcement officials may ultimately
impair that right.”98 It engaged in no discussion of when a “criminal
case” begins, and merely cited to the Chavez plurality in its assertion
that the Fifth Amendment protections only cover use of compelled
statements at trial.99
While the Third and Fifth Circuits devoted little space and analysis
to defining a criminal case, the Fourth Circuit performed a more indepth parsing of the Chavez plurality opinion.100 It also relied on Justice
Souter’s concurrence in determining that the Supreme Court meant
that the Fifth Amendment is only violated when a statement is used at
trial.101 The circuit interpreted the plurality’s opinion in Chavez as
finding that no constitutional violation had occurred because the
compelled testimony was never admitted in court.102 In its analysis, the
Fourth Circuit did not mention that in the Supreme Court’s dismissal
of Chavez’s case, the Court observed that the compelled statements at
issue were not used in any proceedings, since no charges were ever
filed.103
The Fourth Circuit also quoted Justices Souter and Breyer’s
concurrence in Chavez, which said that “the text of the Fifth
Amendment (applied here under the doctrine of Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation) focuses on courtroom use of a criminal
defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony, and the core of
the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of
such evidence.”104 Because it reached this conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit felt it was bound by prior circuit precedent that dictated that it
is only “the use of coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not
in obtaining an indictment, that violates the Constitution.”105
The four circuits that have defined “criminal case” more broadly,
however, have not applied the Fifth Amendment to every pretrial
proceeding. Rather, the circuits have extended the right on a case-by98. Murray, 405 F.3d at 285.
99. Id. n.12.
100. Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 513–14 (4th Cir. 2005); see supra notes 91, 92, 93
(comparing the word counts of each circuit’s Self-Incrimination Clause and Chavez analyses).
101. Id. at 513.
102. Id. at 513.
103. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 777 (2003).
104. Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513 (quoting Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770).
105. Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 2003).

HUGHES FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

PRETRIAL AND ERROR

4/20/2020 9:10 AM

159

case basis to the specific pretrial proceeding at issue in each case. The
Second Circuit has held that the right against self-incrimination applies
to an initial appearance at which bail is set.106 The Seventh Circuit first
noted that a criminal case includes bail hearings, arraignment hearings,
and probable cause hearings under the Fifth Amendment,107 later
adding suppression hearings to the circuit’s definition of a criminal
case.108 And the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal case, for the purposes
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, includes the filing of formal charges
against the declarant, proceedings to determine judicially that the
prosecution may continue, and proceedings that determine pretrial
custody status.109 The most recent circuit to adopt a more expansive
understanding of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit, held that
“criminal case” includes probable cause hearings.110
Each circuit that has held that the Fifth Amendment applies to
pretrial proceedings has provided a significant and thorough analysis
of the Chavez opinion, and of what constitutes the initiation of a
“criminal case.”111 This Note posits that circuits should adopt the Tenth
Circuit’s extensive Fifth Amendment analysis in Vogt v. City of Hays.112
The Tenth Circuit in Vogt examined the Amendment’s purpose,
Supreme Court precedent on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, the
Framers’ intent, and the text of the amendment. In addition to
endorsing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis determining that “criminal case”
covers pretrial proceedings, this Note offers a public policy rationale
for extending the right to pretrial proceedings, which aligns with the
Court’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment precedents.
After the Tenth Circuit held in Vogt v. City of Hays that the Fifth
Amendment applies to pretrial proceedings, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in that case to clarify what a “criminal case” is for the
Self-Incrimination Clause. Three months after oral argument, the Court

106. Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2007).
107. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1026–1027 (7th Cir. 2006).
108. Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2009).
109. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)
110. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, City of Hays v.
Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017).
111. The Second Circuit’s opinion included 990 words discussing Chavez and what constitutes
a criminal case. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 171–73. The Seventh Circuit explored the issue in 1,543 words
in its first case on the issue. Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1023–27. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue
in 1,552 words. Stoot, 582 F.3d at 922–25. The Tenth Circuit spent the most time on the issue,
evaluating the Chavez decision and the meaning of a criminal case in 3,835 words. Vogt, 844 F.3d
at 1239–46.
112. 844 F.3d 1235 (2017).
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dismissed the case as improvidently granted.113 There is speculation
that the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted because it
was fraught with procedural issues.114 Supreme Court commentators
noted that the three-month lag between oral arguments and the case’s
dismissal suggest that the Court’s interest was piqued.115 Moreover, it
has been suggested that the Court will be looking for a “clean” cert
petition on this issue to readdress the case.116
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
By dismissing Vogt as improvidently granted, the Supreme Court
left the Tenth Circuit’s holding untouched, offering no opinion on the
circuit’s analysis or holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies
to pretrial proceedings. This Note, however, proposes that the Tenth
Circuit’s in-depth analysis of the Self-Incrimination Clause should be
adopted by the Court and other circuits. This section provides an
overview of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the Court’s precedent
regarding the application of the Self-Incrimination Clause within the
pretrial context. It will also describe the opinion’s textual analysis of
the Fifth Amendment. This section concludes with a discussion of the
Tenth Circuit’s evaluation of the Fifth Amendment’s history, which
suggests that the Self-Incrimination Clause is more than a “trial right.”
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Examination of Supreme Court Precedent
Concerning the Self-Incrimination Clause
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis examined both Supreme Court
precedent on the parameters of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the
Fifth Amendment more broadly. As the Tenth Circuit noted, the Court
has long allowed the Fifth Amendment to be invoked by witnesses
during grand jury proceedings.117 In the seminal case extolling a

113. Rory Little, Opinion analysis: A DIG in Vogt, SCOTUSBLOG (May 29th, 2018 4:17 pm),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/opinion-analysis-a-dig-in-vogt/.
114. Id. At oral argument, the Justices expressed concerns about non-record information,
which allegedly suggested that some of the plaintiff’s factual allegations were questionable. The
Justices openly sparred about whether the non-record information should be considered. Further,
the City of Kansas noted that the statements at issue “were viewed as ‘compelled’ only by
application of a 1967 employment-law decision . . . that has long been controversial,” and asked
the Court to reconsider the doctrine (even though that was not mentioned in the cert petition).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892), overruled in part by Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). This holding was later limited by Kastigar, which found
that the government can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth
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witness’s right to the Fifth Amendment privilege, Counselman v.
Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he case before the grand
jury was . . . a criminal case,” and because of this, the witness could
invoke the privilege to remain silent.118 The Court’s analysis was
informed by the text of the Fifth Amendment, particularly in light of
the text of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment specifically
employs the term “criminal prosecution” in describing its limits, and
the Court stated that a “criminal prosecution” is much narrower than
the term “criminal case,” which is employed by the Fifth
Amendment.119 The Court used this analysis to bolster its conclusion
that grand jury proceedings are part of a criminal case for the purposes
of the Self-Incrimination Clause.120
In contrast to Counselman, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez later suggested that the right against selfincrimination is limited to trial.121 But this suggestion was made in dicta;
the issue in Verdugo-Urquidez was the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, and the Court only analyzed the Fifth Amendment in an
effort to define the Fourth Amendment’s scope.122 Thus, the Court’s
reasoning regarding the Self-Incrimination Clause does not carry
precedential weight because the Fifth Amendment was not an issue in
the case.
The Court has since refused to limit the Fifth Amendment by
finding that the right expires when the trial concludes following the
judge or jury’s determination of guilt or innocence.123 Rather, the Court
has held that the protection against self-incrimination applies to the
sentencing phase of a criminal trial.124 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court rejected the argument that sentencing proceedings are not part
of a “criminal case,” because such a view is contrary to law and common
sense.125 In Chavez, the Court had another opportunity to define the
Fifth Amendment as only a trial right, but notably refused to do so.126

Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination if the government promises
immunity to the witness.
118. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562.
119. Id. at 563.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
122. Id.
123. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2017).
124. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327 (1999).
125. Id.
126. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003).
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B. The Tenth Circuit’s Textual Analysis of the Fifth Amendment
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the Supreme Court’s analysis of the
Fifth Amendment in the seminal Self-Incrimination Clause case,
Counselman. In particular, the Tenth Circuit echoed the Court’s
determination that the language “criminal case” is much broader than
the Sixth Amendment’s use of “criminal prosecution.”127 In addition to
noting that the phrase “criminal case” appears to encompass the
proceedings of a “criminal prosecution,” the Tenth Circuit examined
the term’s plain meaning at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s
ratification.128 The Tenth Circuit cited to four dictionaries from the
Founding era, including the dictionary that the Supreme Court often
cites as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution.129 These
definitions ultimately led the Tenth Circuit to conclude that the
Founders understood that “case” was not limited to a trial. 130 This
understanding seems particularly strong given that the Framers could
have restricted the right to “trial.”131 The Framers specifically used
“trial” in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments,132 and also used the
phrase “criminal prosecution” in the Sixth Amendment.133 The Tenth
Circuit reasoned that the use of different phrases in these adjacent
amendments was a deliberate choice of the Framers, supporting the
view that the Fifth Amendment is not simply at trial right. 134
The Tenth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Blyew v.
United States to further support its textual analysis.135 In Blyew, the
Court defined “case” in Article III broadly, declaring that “[t]he words
‘case’ and ‘cause’ are constantly used as synonyms in statutes and
judicial decisions, each meaning a proceeding in court, a suit, or
action.”136 The Tenth Circuit found that this centuries-old Supreme
Court definition of “case,” particularly as a “proceeding in court,”
meant that the Fifth Amendment’s use of “criminal case” is not limited
to trial.137
127. Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1242.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1242–43.
130. Id. at 1243.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 80 U.S. 581, 584 (1871). Justice Thomas also cited to this opinion in his analysis of
“criminal case” during his plurality opinion in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003).
136. Id. at 595.
137. Vogt, 844 F.3d at 1243.
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C. The Tenth Circuit’s Examination of the Fifth Amendment’s
Legislative History
The Tenth Circuit also engaged in a thread of analysis that no other
circuit (on either side of the split) has explored: an extensive evaluation
of the history surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Fifth
Amendment.138 The Tenth Circuit first noted that when James Madison
drafted the Amendment, he did not confine the Self-Incrimination
Clause to “criminal case[s],” but broadly wrote the Clause as “nor shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself,” which could be
interpreted as extending to civil cases as well.139 In subsequent floor
debates, a Representative suggested that the Fifth Amendment should
be limited to criminal cases, in an attempt to distinguish civil and
criminal liability.140 Historical sources from this time show that the right
against self-incrimination was understood to arise not at criminal trial,
but in pretrial proceedings.141
The Tenth Circuit also explained that limiting the Fifth Amendment
to a defendant’s trial would have been superfluous, because at this time,
criminal defendants were unable to testify at their own trial.142
Therefore, the rational understanding of the right is that it was meant
for non-trial proceedings.143 In addition, the Tenth Circuit noted that
the Sixth Amendment also provides rights to the defendant alone
(unlike the Fifth Amendment, which can be invoked by any witness).144
The deliberate placement of the Self-Incrimination Clause in the Fifth
Amendment illustrates that it was not intended to be restricted to trial;
indeed, it was not even intended to be restricted even to defendants.145
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FAVORS APPLYING THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis, while thorough and appropriate, is not
exhaustive. In addition to endorsing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis and
holding that the Self-Incrimination Clause extends to pretrial
proceedings, this Note provides an analysis of the Supreme Court’s
precedent that also promotes the application of this protection to
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 1244–46.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1244–45.
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
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pretrial proceedings. This section explores the Court’s application of
the Self-Incrimination Clause generally and how pretrial proceedings
align with this precedent. It also examines Court precedent defining
pretrial proceedings as part of a “criminal case” within the context of
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and other contexts. Identifying
these proceedings as part of a “criminal case” is consistent with both
the text of the Fifth Amendment, and Justice Thomas’s plurality
opinion in Chavez.
A. The Supreme Court’s Broad Application of the Self-Incrimination
Clause
The Supreme Court has consistently articulated that the “basic
function” of the Fifth Amendment is to “protect innocent men . . . who
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.”146 The
Court has also observed that the Fifth Amendment’s “sole concern is
to afford protection against being forced to give testimony leading to
the infliction of [criminal] penalties.”147 Additionally, the Court has
asserted that the Self-Incrimination Clause in particular “reflects a
complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an
important advance in the development of our liberty.”148 In keeping this
critical concern in mind, the Court has sworn to “zealous[ly] . . .
safeguard the values which underlie the [Fifth Amendment]
privilege.”149
The Court has upheld this pledge by holding that the right against
self-incrimination is not limited to criminal defendants. Witnesses who
reasonably believe that danger or penalty may result from their
answers are able to invoke the Fifth Amendment.150 Even an innocent
witness who provides truthful answers may invoke this privilege.151 The
right against self-incrimination is not limited to information that would
lead to a criminal conviction. This right also extends to evidence that
could provide a link to an evidence chain needed to support the case
for prosecuting a criminal.152 What qualifies as acting as a “witness”

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445.
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)
Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 421–22.
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001).
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against oneself covers not only compelled oral testimony, but also
compelled production of papers and belongings.153
The Supreme Court’s view of Miranda also supports a broad
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated that
Miranda’s exclusionary rule “sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself” in order to support the protections provided by the
Self-Incrimination Clause.154 Finally, the Court has noted that the Fifth
Amendment “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects
against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be
used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.”155
B. Supreme Court Precedent Declaring Preliminary Hearings as Part
of a Criminal Case
Although Justice Thomas deferred from providing a definitive
starting point of a criminal case, he clearly articulated the principle that
a case begins, at the very least, at the “initiation of legal proceedings.”156
In the context of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
provided definitions of what qualifies as a legal proceeding and which
pretrial hearings are part of a “criminal prosecution”; these pretrial
hearings trigger the Amendment’s right to counsel.157 The Tenth Circuit
determined that the term “criminal case” is broader than the Sixth
Amendment’s use of “criminal prosecution.”158 Because “criminal
case” encompasses the multiple stages of a criminal prosecution, the
Fifth Amendment should be applied to each proceeding that is covered
by the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. Furthermore, the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment’s SelfImpeachment Clause share a similar purpose. The Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel attaches to adversarial pretrial proceedings in which
the accused may be prejudiced or face loss of liberty.159 This purpose is
153. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974).
154. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
155. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (emphasis added).
156. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003).
157. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (right to counsel attaches at a
defendant’s “initial appearance”); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (right to counsel
attaches at post-arraignment interrogation because adversarial proceedings had begun); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (right to counsel attaches at pretrial lineup).
158. Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2017).
159. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213, 217 (2008) (holding that the right to
counsel attaches at “criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where . . . his
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equally applicable to the Self-Impeachment Clause: the privilege can
be invoked in any proceeding, civil or criminal, where a defendant’s
disclosures could be used against him in a criminal prosecution (and
thus lead to a loss of his liberty).160 The pretrial proceedings that trigger
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be covered by the Fifth
Amendment because both protect the individual in a case that may
result in a loss of liberty.161
In its analysis of whether a proceeding requires the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel, the Court first evaluates whether the
proceeding is a “critical stage” of prosecution that requires the aid of
an attorney.162 In making determinations about what qualifies as a
“critical stage,” the Court has used language similar to that in Justice
Thomas’s plurality opinion in Chavez. Specifically, the Court has
determined that a criminal trial commences at “‘the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.’”163 The rationale is simple: at this point, the government
has committed itself to prosecution, and the accused is in the midst of
complex procedural and substantive criminal law.164 A commitment to
prosecution is self-evidently adversarial.
In guaranteeing a defendant’s right to counsel at an initial
appearance (whether on a formal complaint or an arraignment on
indictment), the Court reaffirmed precedent that “by the time a
defendant is brought before a judicial officer,” an adversarial
relationship has begun.165 The fact that a defendant may then have
restrictions imposed on his freedoms only furthers the inference that
liberty is subject to restriction” and further holding that the right attaches at a preliminary hearing
because “substantial prejudice. . . inheres”).
160. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444–45.
161. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (finding that the right to counsel
attaches to criminal cases which may result in the accused’s loss of liberty); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at
444–45 (noting that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination “reflects a
complex of our fundamental values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the
development of our liberty”). The right to counsel has also been considered critical to ensuring
the right to a fair trial. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968).
162. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). The Court noted that the determination
whether the hearing is a “critical stage” that requires counsel depends on an analysis “whether
potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the
ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
227 (1967)).
163. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality
opinion)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
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these proceedings are adversarial in nature.166 The right to counsel
applies at a pre-indictment preliminary hearing, where the court
determines if there is sufficient evidence to warrant presenting a case
to the grand jury; if there is, the court will also set bail if required. 167
This is particularly true because these hearings present an opportunity
for a lawyer to examine and cross-examine witnesses, which may
expose fatal flaws in the State’s case and cause the magistrate to refuse
to set bail.168 The Court repeatedly recognized that these arraignment
proceedings are so critical that “[w]hat happens there may affect the
whole trial.”169 The Court has further treated the bail hearings as a
“critical stage of the State’s criminal process at which the accused is as
much entitled to such aid (of counsel) . . . as at the trial itself.”170
C. Additional Doctrine Identifying Pretrial Proceedings as Part of a
Criminal Case
Outside the context of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, the
Court has noted several additional proceedings that qualify as the
initiation of a criminal prosecution. This includes probable cause
hearings (for the purpose of § 1983 claims).171 The Court held in Burns
v. Reed that “appearing at a probable-cause hearing is ‘intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process . . .’ and with
the initiation and conduct of a prosecution.”172 Arrest warrants173 and
grand jury proceedings174 are two additional ways that the government
can initiate the legal process of a criminal trial. Furthermore, Congress
has identified pretrial processes as part of “legal proceedings,” to use
Justice Thomas’s words, in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.175
While some of the Rules cover purely technical aspects of federal
166. Id.
167. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 8.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961); see also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59,
60, (1963) (finding that the preliminary hearing as a critical stage of trial, because the petitioner
entered a plea before the magistrate judge, without assistance of counsel).
170. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9–10 (emphasis added).
171. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1991).
172. Id. at 492 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
173. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 n.6 (2017).
174. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (“There is every reason to believe that
our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor.
The basic purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal
proceedings against persons believed to have committed crimes.” (emphasis added)).
175. Jordan Gross, An Ounce of Pretrial Prevention Is Worth More Than a Pound of PostConviction Cure: Untethering Federal Pretrial Criminal Procedure From Due Process Standards
of Review, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 317, 324 (2013).
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criminal procedure, such as recording requirements for preliminary
hearings, many Rules address procedures with substantive and
constitutional dimensions.176 The scope of the Rules govern “all
criminal proceedings,”177 which includes Title II, the section covering
“Preliminary Proceedings.”178 The Rules also encompass grand jury
proceedings,179 indictments,180 arraignments,181 pleas,182 and pleadings
and pretrial hearings.183 An understanding of these pretrial proceedings
as worthy of the Fifth Amendment’s protections aligns with Justice
Thomas’s statement that a case begins at the initiation of legal
proceedings. It also supports Supreme Court precedent and interest in
ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected at all stages of a
criminal case.
V. POLICY RATIONALE FOR APPLYING THE SELF-INCRIMINATION
CLAUSE TO PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
There are significant policy reasons that bolster the view that all
who have been formally accused of a crime should be able to invoke
this right. This section of the Note advocates extending the Fifth
Amendment’s protections to preliminary proceedings to address
underlying public policy concerns, and also explores opponents’ beliefs
that such an extension would be difficult for the justice system to
handle.
A. Policy Arguments for a Broad Understanding of the SelfIncrimination Clause
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Chavez noted that extending
the bare guarantees of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause may be warranted if it is needed to protect the core of the right
against contemporary society’s pressures.184 The invasive pressures of
contemporary society is evidenced by the steadily increasing
percentage of guilty pleas. Our criminal justice system has largely
176. Id. at 320–21.
177. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1.
178. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3–5.1. These sections as encompassed in Title II cover criminal
complaints, arrest warrants, the initial appearance and preliminary hearings.
179. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10.
182. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
183. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
184. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 777 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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foregone trials in favor of plea deals. In 2018, 97.4% of federal offenders
pled guilty, which is a half percent increase from the 96.9% guilty plea
rate in 2013.185 In contrast, only 83% of federal cases resolved in 1979
were the result of guilty pleas.186 This is not solely a federal issue; 94%
of state criminal convictions resulted in guilty pleas.187
This trend may be a consequence of how pretrial proceedings
unfold. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the most critical
period of the proceedings against these defendants . . . [is] from the time
of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial.”188 The use of
coerced statements during this critical stage can shape the outcome of
the case and whether a defendant chooses to plead or proceed to trial.
The role that pretrial proceedings—particularly bail hearings—can
play in a defendant’s decision to plead cannot be overstated. The
process costs of pretrial detention and bail bonds are two critical factors
in most misdemeanor defendants’ decision to plead guilty rather than
face trial.189 It can be particularly compelling to plead guilty when a
defendant considers that the length of the pretrial detention can equal
or even exceed the punishment that may be imposed after trial.190 An
offer to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of time already served
is one that many defendants feel is too good to refuse.191 Furthermore,
pretrial detention can hamper a defendant’s ability to prepare for his
trial: for instance, it is more difficult for detained defendants to meet
with their attorneys.192 This further incentivizes quick plea bargains in
misdemeanors, even if the defendant would probably win acquittal at
an eventual trial.193

185. See Fiscal Year 2018 Overview, supra note 27; see also Dep’t of Justice Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 27.
186. Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr., Univ. of Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics Online tbl.5.22.2010 (Kathleen Maguire ed.), http://www.albany.edu/source
book/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
187. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372
(2010) (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.”).
188. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
189. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 951–55 (1983).
190. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2492 (2004).
191. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2146 (1998).
192. Bibas, supra note 190190, at 2492.
193. See id. In these instances, “the shadow of pretrial detention looms much larger over these
small cases than does the shadow of trial.”

HUGHES FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

170

4/20/2020 9:10 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 15

Even an acquittal at trial cannot recover the toll of days spent in jail
during pretrial detention.194 The desire of defendants for immediate
release from jail gives prosecutors more leverage to obtain a plea from
detained defendants than from those free on bail.195 In this vein,
prosecutors sometimes engage in a practice known as overcharging, or
alternatively as “charge-piling,” in which prosecutors will charge the
defendant with a more serious crime, or multiple crimes, thereby
exposing the accused to a higher sentence.196 The “charge bargain” is
then an agreement to replace a higher charge with a lower one in
exchange for a guilty plea; it often results in prosecutors obtaining the
sentence that they actually prefer in the most efficient means
possible.197 In some instances, a defendant who is guilty of only one of
the charges may have difficulty defending successfully against both and
decide to plead.198 Pretrial processes are crucial to determining when a
prosecutor may be overreaching (either factually or legally) in the
charges.199
As Justice Ginsburg noted during her questioning at oral argument
in Vogt v. City of Hays, it seems contrary to common sense that evidence
which would be inadmissible at trial could be introduced at a probable
cause hearing to determine if there is enough evidence to go to trial.200
194. Id. at 2493.
195. Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 439, 444 (1971).
196. Crespo, supra note 59, at 1313–14. The author exemplifies “charge-piling” using a
defendant who omits armed robbery, “[a]nd yet, in practice, a prosecutor could and routinely
would commence a prosecution against such a defendant by piling on a host of additional charges,
including (to list just some examples) aggravated assault, theft, threats, possession of a weapon,
and using a firearm during a crime of violence.” Id. at 1314.
197. Id. at 1311–12. This Note is not suggesting that prosecutors try to convict innocent
persons of crimes they did not commit. Rather, scholars have concluded that “various pressures
on prosecutors . . . can cause them to act in ways that subvert justice . . . [often] unintentionally.”
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 295 (observing that prosecutors can suffer from “tunnel vision” that
prevents them from seeing the flaws in their case); Cf. United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417,
420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]o coerce cooperation . . . prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh,
enhanced mandatory sentences that no one—not even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are
appropriate.”).
198. Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1143 (2005).
199. Crespo, supra note 59, at 1332; see also Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 865 (1995) (observing that prosecutors sometimes exploit the gap “between the quantity and
quality of evidence necessary to support a legitimate charge and the quantity and quality of
evidence needed to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense”).
200. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, City of Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (mem.) (2017)
(No. 16–1495).
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The same is true of arraignments, bail hearings, or indictments. The case
of Teresa Sornberger is a perfect illustration of the use of such
statements and their impact. Teresa Sornberger’s coerced confession,
which would have been inadmissible at the trial stage, was used to find
probable cause for a trial and to set her bail at an amount that she could
not meet.201
Teresa Sornberger’s circumstances are hardly unique; five out of six
defendants remain in jail awaiting trial because they cannot afford bail
amounts.202 In 2017, only 40 percent of all federal defendants were
released on bail.203 Empirical studies show that many more defendants
are imprisoned before trial than are convicted and imprisoned
following trial.204 Additional empirical data shows that if all defendants
had the economic capability to make bail, fewer than 6.8% of
defendants would plead guilty to misdemeanors.205 Eliminating the use
of statements that would be considered inadmissible at trial could
alleviate the burden on defendants and chip away at the system of mass
incarceration.
B. Counter-Arguments: In Favor of Limiting the Fifth Amendment to
Trial
Advocates for limiting the Self-Incrimination Clause to a trial right
have expressed several concerns about understanding the parameters
of a “criminal case” to include pretrial proceedings. They believe that
the text and the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause show that it
applies only to trial proceedings. Advocates of this view, including the
Department of Justice, have also raised concerns that extending the
right would fundamentally alter the nature of pretrial proceedings and
lead to inefficiency among the courts.
201. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006).
202. Thomas H. Cohen & Brian A. Reaves, Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State
Courts, Bureau Just. Stat. 1 (Nov. 2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf. See
also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial
Justice (June 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110601.html
(noting that many pretrial detainees have been “charged with crimes ranging from petty theft to
public drug use,” and that they are detained “because they simply cannot afford to post the bail
required—very often, just a few hundred dollars—to return home until their day in court
arrives”).
203. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, Pretrial
Services - Judicial Business 2017, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/pretrial-servicesjudicial-business-2017 (last visited on Mar. 3, 2020). This percentage decreases to 28% when
immigration cases are included in the analysis.
204. Alschuler, supra note 189, at 953.
205. Lynch, supra note 191, at 2146.
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The Solicitor General has suggested that a Self-Incrimination
Clause violation requires that the statement be incriminating and
would establish a defendant’s criminal responsibility.206 The
government also has argued that preliminary proceedings do not
determine criminal guilt or innocence.207 The government’s argument
overlooks the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment: that the privilege
can be invoked in any criminal case, and that Justice Thomas has
explained that the criminal case begins with the initiation of adverse
legal proceedings. A preliminary or bail hearing, is, by its nature,
adversarial. If these hearings were not adversarial, the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel would not apply. Nor does the
government’s argument address the claim that the Founders could have
limited the Fifth Amendment by specifically using “trial,” rather than
“case.”
An understanding that the Self-Incrimination Clause precludes
compelled statements against interest in pretrial proceedings
necessarily means that the court would have to resolve admissibility
issues either before or during pretrial proceedings. Admissibility is not
always a simple determination to make because it involves “careful
scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances.”208 Requiring that
suppression issues be resolved in preliminary proceedings may delay
the proceedings. 209 This may lead to logistical issues because many
pretrial proceedings are supposed to be completed soon after charges
are filed.210 There is a concern that these deadlines would be difficult to
meet, and resolution of the ultimate issues delayed, if courts also need
to determine the admissibility of challenged evidence.211
There is no doubt that some of these concerns are valid. But as
Justice Sotomayor noted during the Vogt v. City of Hays oral arguments,
of the four circuits which have held that the Fifth Amendment applies

206. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, City of
Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–1495).
207. Id. at 11.
208. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
209. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, City of Hays
v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–1495).
210. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(c) (requiring that the preliminary hearing take place within 21
days of the initial appearance if the defendant is not in custody, and within 14 days after the initial
appearance if the defendant is in custody); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (requiring that initial
appearances occur “without unnecessary delay”); Pretrial Hearings, supra note 30, at 286 (noting
that Gerstein hearings must be held within 48 hours of arrest).
211. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 30, City of Hays
v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16–1495).
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to pretrial proceedings, none have been “gummed up” by this shift.212
This may be because not every defendant will have a statement that
they wish to contest as a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause. It
may also be that the analysis is often less difficult or cumbersome than
proponents of limiting this privilege to trial suggest.
CONCLUSION
Any observer of the criminal justice system knows that the case
does not begin when the judge enters the courtroom on the first day of
trial. The nature of our system means that the judge has already made
several important decisions that affect trial proceedings and strategy,
and counsel on both sides have advocated different aspects of their case
in front of the judge. While the Chavez decision may have failed to
specify a specific moment when a “criminal case” begins, Justice
Thomas’s explanation alone that it “requires the initiation of legal
proceedings,” is enough to demand that the Self-Incrimination Clause
should cover all pretrial proceedings. This understanding is only
bolstered in consideration of the Tenth Circuit’s extensive analysis, as
well as the Court’s understanding of pretrial processes as legal
proceedings, and the policy rationales for extending the right to the
period before opening statements.
The balance of values between efficiency and the protection of the
rights of the accused has always been a difficult one. But the capacity
for pretrial proceedings to impair or severely impact a person’s liberties
shows that in this critical stage before trial, it makes little sense to
weaponize statements that would be inadmissible at trial. Using a
person’s statements against his interest and compelling him to be a
witness against himself in a way that results in the loss of liberty or
hampers the ensuing trial is exactly what the Self-Incrimination Clause
is meant to prevent.

212. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, City of Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (mem.) (2017)
(No. 16–1495).

